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COMMENTS

The Cents of It: Dischargeability and
Environmental Claims Under the
Bankcruptcy Code
INTRODUCTION

The United States produces more than 260 million tons of
hazardous waste each year.' Over the past few decades, the improper
disposal of this waste has increased dramatically, so that the cleanup
will cost $200 to $300 billion each year.' In an effort to pass the
burden of handling the nation's hazardous waste problem on to the
responsible solvent parties,3 Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Conservation, and Liability Act ("CEREnvironmental Response,
4
CLA") in 1980.
Unfortunately, the tremendous costs associated with the cleanup
of hazardous waste has forced many of these previously solvent
companies into bankruptcy. 5 The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has estimated that the cost of a single
1. 138 CONG. REC. 595, 23-24 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Specter). This number reflects the amount of reported hazardous waste. The total
amount from all reported and nonreported sources should be much higher.
2. The public resources available for cleanup are severely limited compared to
the size of the hazardous waste problem. 10,000 sites are expected to be placed on
the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priority List and the total response
cost for the cleanup has been estimated at $200 to $300 billion. In 1988, 895 sites
were ready for clean up. However, the EPA had identified fewer than 300 solvent
responsible parties. Consequently, the public has paid for 90%0 of the cleanup costs
while private parties have paid less than 10% of the cost. Ronald G. Aronovsky &
Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporationsfor HazardousSubstance Releases
Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 421, 424 (1990) (citing Office of Program
Management, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. EPA, 54 Fed. Reg.
33,850 (1989)).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
4. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988)).
5. Joseph L. Cosetti & Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank,
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hazardous waste cleanup averages twenty-five million dollars. 6 Given
the escalating cleanup costs of existing hazardous waste sites and the
rising operating costs due to more stringent federal hazardous waste
standards, bankruptcy filings of potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") are expected to rise dramatically.7 The EPA has estimated
that twenty-five to thirty percent of PRPs will file bankruptcy petitions
over the next fifty years.'
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19789 ("Bankruptcy Code") with the underlying purpose of facilitating a fresh start
for debtors.' 0 CERCLA's expansive liability provisions and the doctrine of fresh start have been perceived as promoting inconsistent
goals and conflicting policies." This perception has led to increased
confusion in case law as to the proper treatment of environmental
2
cleanup costs within bankruptcy proceedings.'
No one disputes the fact that cleanup costs can be considered a
claim under the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, it is the determination of
Kovacs, and Penn Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental LawPerceived Conflicts and Options for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies,
7 J.L. & COMM. 65, 68 (1987).

6. John M. Van Lieshout, Bankruptcy Code Offers Little Protection to
Polluters, 64 Wis. LAW. 11, 11 (1991) (citing UNITED STATES ENVmONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,

(1990)).

PROGRESS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING SUPERFUND,

1989, at xxii

7. Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 5, at 68.
8. Id.

9. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
10. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6296, 6297. The debtor is said to receive a "fresh start" once the
debtor is relieved of his or her financial obligations. All proceedings, enforcement
actions and other efforts to collect from the debtor are stayed the moment the debtor
files his or her bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
11. See Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 1988); Penn Terra Ltd. v.
Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 1984); Jensen v. Bank
of Am., 114 B.R. 700, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1991).
12. For example, the district court in Jensen heavily weighed environmental
and safety concerns against bankruptcy law and held that an environmental "claim"
does not arise until the actual cleanup costs are incurred by the state or federal
environmental regulatory agency. Jensen, 114 B.R. at 706. However, the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the lower court ruling and held that a
hazardous waste release occurring prepetition is dischargeable in bankruptcy whether
or not costs were incurred before or after the bankruptcy proceeding. Jensen, 127
B.R. at 33; see Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 997 (holding that a dischargeable environ-
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when a claim arises under bankruptcy law which is the critical
distinction. Only creditors who hold claims against the debtor can
share in the distribution of the estate, and only claims can be
discharged under the Bankruptcy Code. 3 The point at which a claim
arises determines whether a particular claim will be discharged under
the Bankruptcy Code. Claims arising after the filing14of the bankruptcy
petition are generally held to be nondischargeable.
Although cleanup costs can be considered claims, 5 many PRPs
argue that a claim arises at the time of the release or threatened
release of hazardous waste and is, therefore, dischargeable.' 6 The
government argues, however, that liability arises at the point when
cleanup costs are incurred.' 7 Some courts reject both of these arguments and hold that a claim arises when the relationship between the
debtor and the EPA is such that future CERCLA claims can be
anticipated against the debtor."
This comment argues that the proper determination of when a
CERCLA claim arises is at the point when a PRP receives actual
notice of potential cleanup liability from a federal or state environmental regulatory agency. This proposal better facilitates the underlying goals of the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA within the existing
statutory framework. J3oth the EPA and the PRP would be aware of
potential liability which would assist the EPA in protecting itself in
the event the PRP files a bankruptcy petition. An actual notice
standard would provide predictability and increase settlement negotiamental claim arises if (1) the hazardous waste release occurred prepetition, and (2) if
the relationship between the debtor and environmental regulatory agency was such
that the agency could anticipate future environmental claims).

13.

GEORGE

M.

TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

§ 6.01

(2d ed. 1991).
14. See, e.g., In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
15. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1985).
16. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999; Jensen, 114 B.R. at 702.
17. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1000; Jensen, 114 B.R. at 702.
18. Courts often use cases involving tort-based claims to determine when a
claim arises under the relationship approach. One often cited case is In re Edge, 60
B.R. 690, 691 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (holding that a bankruptcy claim arose at
the earliest point at which a relationship was established between the patient and the
dentist: the point when the negligent act was performed). See also Schweitzer v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.) (holding that a contingent claim
requires a relevant legal relationship), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Pettibone
Corp. v. Ramirez, 90 B.R. 918, 931-33 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that a
relationship must exist before a debtor should be required to anticipate potential
claims against him by a creditor).
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tions between the EPA and the PRP which may take away the
incentive to file bankruptcy.
To this end, part I of this comment summarizes pertinent aspects
of CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, discussing the goals of each
statute and the underlying policies served. Part II discusses four main
approaches utilized by the courts, analyzing the rationale of each
approach in terms of its consistency with the doctrine of fresh start
and CERCLA's liability scheme. As none of these approaches adequately address the current conflict between these two statutory
schemes, a need exists to adopt a new approach which will provide
predictability and consistency in resolving issues regarding the status
of environmental claims. Thus, part III proposes the adoption of an
actual notice standard for CERCLA claims and advocates legislative
action to amend the Bankruptcy Code. A CERCLA claim should
arise under bankruptcy law when official notice is given that a party
has been identified as a PRP by an environmental regulatory agency.
Further, Congress should amend section 52319 of the Bankruptcy Code
to create an exception to the dischargeability of environmental claims.
The current debate over the point at which a claim arises under
the Bankruptcy Code is misplaced. The real concern lies in the
imminent need to extend the liability of CERCLA to reach the parties
responsible for improper hazardous waste disposal. The need for
expedient hazardous waste cleanup far outweighs a debtor's interest
in receiving a fresh start. Unfortunately, until Congress takes action
to amend section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, the courts must find
some way of dealing with the competing policy objectives of both
Acts.

I.

CERCLA

AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

The conflict between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code arises
out of the public policy interests implicated by these two Acts.
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to expand the scope of liability for
improper hazardous waste disposal. 20 Under CERCLA, the EPA and
19. See infra note 60.
20. The major feature of CERCLA is the liability standard imposed on owners
or operators of leaking hazardous waste sites. CERCLA defines liability according
to the standard set forth in § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
See CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1980). Prior to CERCLA's enactment
in 1980, the Clean Water Act was routinely interpreted by the courts as imposing a
strict liability standard. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th
Cir. 1978) (holding a barge operator strictly liable for cleanup costs of oil discharged
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state agencies are authorized to take immediate action to cleanup a
hazardous site and then seek reimbursement from PRPs. 21 Congress
established a "Superfund" to finance the government's cleanup efforts. The Superfund also obtains funding from taxes imposed on
petroleum and chemical22manufacturing industries which are used to
pay for cleanup actions.
CERCLA's liability provisions are broadly construed in order to
spread these cleanup costs among as many PRPs as possible. 23 CER-

into navigable waters). In Burgess v. Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977), the court
interpreted § 311 of the Clean Water Act, stating:
ITihere appears to be no specifically significant legislative history, other
than a change from a House version based on fault to a Senate version in
the direction of strict liability, but this change itself indicates that unless the
exceptions are narrowly construed, the legislative purpose would be largely
vitiated.
Id. at 982. Only three defenses are expressly authorized by CERCLA: a) an act of
God, b) an act of war, and c) a release caused by a third person with whom defendant
had no contractual relationship and that defendant exercised due care with respect
to hazardous substance concerned and took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of third parties. In addition to those defenses authorized under § 107(b)(3),
some courts have held that PRPs should be able to assert equitable defenses. United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 204 (W.D. Mo. 1985); see also
infra note 23 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
23. Legislative history strongly suggests that CERCLA's broad liability scheme
was intended to spread cleanup costs among as many parties as possible. The judicial
trend has been to extend liability to parent corporations. Courts have interpreted
CERCLA's liability category of "owner or operator" to imply that corporate status,
while relevant to determine ownership, cannot shield a person from operator liability.
See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
parent company directly liable as operator for the hazardous waste activities of its
subsidiary); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th
Cir. 1986) (individual liability under § 9607(a)(3)); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986) (holding parent company liable as operator). But
see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
parent companies not directly liable for the hazardous waste activities of its subsidiaries). The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
expressed this view during the Superfund reauthorization hearings; he observed that
"the theory underlying Superfund's liability scheme was, and is, that government
should obtain the full costs of clean up from those it targets for enforcement." 132
CONG. REC. S14, 903 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford). Courts
have routinely rejected constitutional challenges to CERCLA's broad imposition of
liability because the need to control the hazardous waste problem justifies the
imposition of liability on solvent parties with some connection to the hazardous waste
sites. See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); United States v.
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CLA liability is strict, 24 retroactive, 25 and provides for joint and several
liability. 26 Yet, while CERCLA's provisions seek to extend liability,
the focus of the Bankruptcy Code is to minimize a debtor's liability
to facilitate a fresh start in life.
One of the primary features of bankruptcy law is the fresh start
doctrine. The purpose of this doctrine is to give the debtor a "new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort unhampered by
the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt. ' 2 Although the
emphasis of the Bankruptcy Code is on a fresh start, the Code also
includes several other policies that often come into conflict with this
central policy. For example, Congress has created exceptions to
dischargeability for certain debts which can greatly hinder a debtor's
fresh start. 21 Courts are bound by these legislative judgments that
certain policies deserve higher priority than the general bankruptcy
policy of fresh start. 29 These exceptions resulted from public policy
determinations. Congress believed that some debts should be paid for
ethical reasons, and because the public interest is better served when
the debtor is held responsible for certain debts.30
A.

CERCLA: THE "POLLUTER PAYS"

Congress enacted CERCLA in 19801 and the Superfund Amendments in 198632 in an effort to remedy the nation's hazardous waste
Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-42 (S.D. Ind. 1982); see also
United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding lessee liable
as an "operator" under CERCLA); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that CERCLA applies to current
owners or operators even if no hazardous substances were disposed of during their
ownership); Sunnen Prod. Co. v. Chemtech Indus., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 276, 278
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding past owner or operator of a facility at the time of disposal
liable under CERCLA).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988).
26. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72; New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985).
27. Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
28. Some exceptions to dischargeability which exist under the Bankruptcy Code
include child support and alimony, liability resulting from willful or malicious
conduct, taxes and student loans. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
29. Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1984).
30. See In re Lones, 50 B.R. 801, 802 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) ("the exceptions
to discharge as established by Congress in 11 U.S.C. Section 523 evidence a denial
of discharge based on either public policy decisions . . . or denial to a debtor who
approaches the bankruptcy with 'unclean hands'. . . ."); In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621,

625 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that it was "Congress' belief that debtors do not merit a
fresh start to the extent that their debts fall within § 523").
31. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
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problem. 3 Under CERCLA, a PRP may be sued when a "release"35
or "threatened release"

34

occurs from a facility into the environment.

of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988)).
32. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
33. Before this time, the major source of federal environmental regulation was
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") of 1976. 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6991 (1988). RCRA regulated the licensing, transportation, treatment and
disposal of hazardous waste. RCRA also authorized the EPA to regulate hazardous
wastes from "the point of generation to the site of ultimate disposal . . . ." Cosetti
& Friedman, supra note 5, at 68 n.8. This "cradle to grave" regulation scheme,
however, was not intended to address the liability of PRPs of abandoned waste sites.
Its purpose was to attempt to decrease environmental damage through regulation.
In the late 1970's, a series of events led Congress to further address this problem.
First, public interest in the cleanup of hazardous waste increased dramatically. Some
of the increased awareness came from the highly publicized discovery of buried toxic
chemical waste seeping into residential areas near the abandoned Love Canal in
Niagara County, New York. See BRITISH MEDICAL ASS'N., HAzARDous WASTE AND
HUMAN HEALTH (1991). Second, studies found that many toxic abandoned waste sites
in the United States could not be traced to any specific polluter. From these studies
Congress found that RCRA alone was inadequate to deal with the problem of
abandoned waste sites. Lowell E. Blackham, The Unstoppable Force Hits the
Immovable Wall: Should Environmental Cleanup Liability be Discharged in Bankruptcy?, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1357, 1368 (1992) (citing Walter M. Rogers, "[flt's
All Right to Kill People, But Not Trees": Landowners of Environmentally Unsafe
Properties Must Be Held Strictly Liable for Personal Injuries Caused by Their
ContaminatedLand, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 893, 905 (1991)).
In response to public demand for immediate cleanup of abandoned waste sites,
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to allow the government to step in and then
spread these cleanup costs among as many PRPs as possible.
34. Section 9601(22) of CERCLA defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4)(1988) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
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Once a release or threatened release is identified by the EPA, an
investigation is performed "to determine if the environmental risk is
of sufficient severity to warrant inclusion of the site on the National

Priorities List" ("NPL"). 3 6 Hazardous waste sites placed on the
EPA's NPL consist of the heaviest polluted sites in the United States.

The NPL currently includes approximately 1,200 sites. 37 However,
approximately 32,645 potentially hazardous sites are not included on
3
the NPL. 1
To force cleanup efforts by responsible parties, the government
may seek an administrative order under section 106(a) of CERCLA
requiring the PRP to cleanup the site at its own expense, or the
government may cleanup the site and seek reimbursement from PRPs
for the response costs under section 107(a). 9 Under CERCLA, the

government's cause of action arises and the statute of limitations
begins to run once cleanup costs are incurred. Furthermore, suits for
the recovery of cleanup costs incurred by the federal, state or local
governments or by private parties against PRPs are authorized under
section 9607 of CERCLA. Section 9607 of CERCLA requires that a
plaintiff allege that defendants are "persons," 40 who are responsible
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsist6nt with
the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
36. See Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991).
37. See 40 C.F.R. § 300, apps. A, B (1990).

38. Blackham, supra note 33, at 1370. Inclusion on the NPL is determined by
the severity of the hazardous waste problem. These sites are targeted for more
immediate cleanup than sites which are not included on the list. This does not mean,
however, that PRPs of sites not included on the NPL are not subject to reimbursement
of cleanup costs incurred by the government. See 54 FED. REG. 33,850 (1989).
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a) (1988).
40. The term "person" includes an "individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership or consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1990).
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42
for the "disposal ' 41 of a "hazardous substance" in a "facility"
' 43 of a substance
from which there is a "release or threatened release
into the environment.
At the time CERCLA was enacted, the scope of the hazardous
waste problem was severely underestimated." In order to address the
magnitude of the problem, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorizition Act of 1986 ("SARA"). 45 SARA extended
the-life of Superfund" for five years and provided the program with
an $8.5 billion budget.4 7 Further, SARA authorized the government4
to place a federal lien on the property to secure reimbursement. 8

41. "Disposal" is defined under § 6701(29) of CERCLA according to the
definition set forth in § 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903, as
the "discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking or placing" of any
hazardous waste into or on any land so that such hazardous waste may enter the
environment. CERCLA extends liability for disposal based on a person's status: the
current owners and operators of a hazardous waste site, the owner or operator at
the time of disposal of the hazardous substances, the parties who arranged for the
disposal of the hazardous substances, and the transporters of these substances are all
jointly and severally liable to the government. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4). For a
discussion of recent case law as to the reach of CERCLA liability, see Larry V.
Green, Note, Sifting Through the Ambiguity: A Critical Overview of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act as Amended By
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 191
(1991).
42. Section 101(a) of CERCLA defines "facility" as "(A) any ... building or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(a) (1988).
43. See supra note 34.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 54-56 (providing
rationale for strengthening CERCLA), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 283638.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
46. Section 9611(a) provides:
For the purposes specified in this section there is authorized to be appropriated from the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of title 26 not more than $8,500,000,000 for the 5year period beginning on October 17, 1986, and such funds shall remain
available until expended.
42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988).
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988). Under this section, CERCLA authorizes that
a statutory federal lien shall be placed upon all real property and rights to property
belonging to the PRP subject to a removal or remedial action. The lien shall be
imposed either at the time costs are incurred by the United States or at the time a
party is provided written notice of potential liability (whichever is later). The lien
shall continue until the government is reimbursed or until the lien becomes unenforceable through the operation of the statute of limitations. Id.
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However, the federal lien is subordinate to previously perfected liens
on the property.4 9 A party seeking reimbursement may also seek
declaratory relief for future cleanup costs if the party has already
incurred expenses. 50 Unfortunately, the government's cleanup efforts
have become frustrated by the increasing number of bankruptcy
petitions being filed by PRPs.
B. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: DISCHARGING THE POLLUTER

The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors with a means for obtaining relief from their indebtedness. One major advantage of filing a

bankruptcy petition are the automatic stay provisions of section 362. 1
These provisions prevent creditors from taking any action by way of
garnishment, repossession or lawsuit against a debtor who has filed
bankruptcy. 2 The debtor is protected while he or she attempts to
either liquidate under chapter 7, or reorganize and present a plan
under either chapter 11 or 13.53

49. Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 5, at 100. Under article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, perfection of a secured interest normally occurs by the secured
party's filing a financing statement or taking possession of the collateral. If perfection
occurs before the federal lien is imposed, the secured party prevails over the
government as lien creditor. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1991). See TREISTER, ET AL., supra note
13, § 4.03(a).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9601(23), (25), 9607(a), 9613, 9613(f), (f)(3)(B); 28
U.S.C § 2201 (1988). See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384,
1388 (N.D. I11. 1988).
51. Once the debtor files his/her bankruptcy petition, the commencement or
continuation of most judicial, administrative, or other proceedings against the debtor
are stayed. The automatic stay prevents a creditor from attempting to recover on a
claim against the debtor that arose before the filing of the petition. The scope of the
automatic stay is broadly applied to allow the bankruptcy to proceed unhindered by
the pressure of creditors' collection activities. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1992); TREISTER,
ET AL., supra note 13, § 5.01.
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1992); TREISTER, ET AL., supra note 13, § 5.01; see
also In re Knaus, 889 F.2d 773, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that failure to
voluntarily return property lawfully taken prior to bankruptcy filing was violative of
the automatic stay); In re Elder, 12 B.R. 491, 495 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1961) (holding
that creditor is required to affirmatively act to cease garnishment to give effect to
the automatic stay).
53. This comment focuses only on chapter 7 liquidation and chapter 11
reorganization cases. "Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date
of filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than
$100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000 ...may
be eligible under chapter 13." 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1992). Therefore, a PRP would not
normally be eligible to file chapter 13 given the fact that the average cleanup cost of
a single hazardous waste site is $25 million. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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1. Chapter 11: Reorganization
The goal of chapter 11 is for a corporation or an individual to
be able to obtain protection from creditors while developing a reorganization plan during financial difficulties.5 4 The debtor filing under
chapter 11 remains in possession of the business" (or financial affairs)
56
and a plan is proposed to reorganize the business and repay creditors.
If the debtor's plan is confirmed,5 7 all prepetition debts outside of the
9
plan are discharged" subject to sections 707, 5236 and 1141(3)61 of
the Bankruptcy Code.

54. TREISTER, ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.04.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1992).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1992). The reorganization plan may be proposed by the
debtor, or by any party in interest if a trustee has been appointed, the debtor has
not filed a plan within 120 days after the order for relief, or if the debtor has not
filed a plan that has been accepted within 180 days after the order for relief has been
entered. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1992). The plan of reorganization must be filed within
180 days from the date the petition is filed and it is subject to approval by a
committee of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1992). A disclosure statement is filed with
the plan to provide adequate financial information from which creditors base their
decision of whether to approve the reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1992).
57. A confirmation hearing is held during which the court determines if the
plan has received the majority of acceptances as well as whether the debtor will be
financially able to complete the plan. As part of a chapter 11, the debtor is required
to attend a § 341 Meeting over which the trustee presides. The purpose of this
meeting is to provide an opportunity for the trustee and the debtor's creditors to
question the debtor about the debtor's assets under oath. 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1992).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(l) (1992).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) provides for dismissal for cause by the court or upon
motion by the U.S. Trustee including
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title
28; and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or
such additional time as the court may allow after the filing of the petition
commencing such case, the information required by paragraph (1) of § 521,
but only on a motion by the United States trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1992). Section 707(b) provides for the dismissal by the court or
the U.S. trustee on a finding of substantial abuse in a case filed by an individual
debtor under chapter 7 whose debts are primarily consumer debts. II U.S.C. § 707(b)
(1992).
60. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for exceptions to dischargeability of specific debts. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1992).
61. Section 1141(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(3) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of
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A chapter 11 case may be converted by the debtor to a chapter
7 liquidation bankruptcy at any time unless the debtor is not a debtor
in possession, 62 the case was originally an involuntary filing, or the
case was converted previously to a chapter 11 by anyone other than
the debtor. 63 Other parties in interest or the trustee may also move to
convert or dismiss a debtor's chapter 11 case. 64 Some of the reasons
for which conversion or dismissal may be sought include continuing
losses of the business with little hope of rehabilitation, failure to
effectuate a reorganization plan, unreasonable delay prejudicial to the
creditors or failure to timely file a plan of reorganization. 65
2.

Chapter 7 Liquidation

Chapter 7 bankruptcies are filed by individual persons, partnerships or corporations who are seeking relief from a majority of their
debts.66 A chapter 7 debtor can commence a bankruptcy proceeding
by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court. 67 After the initial filing,
the court appoints a trustee 68 from a panel of trustees. 69 The debtor
the property of the estate;
(B) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the
plan; and
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under § 727(a) of this title
if the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(3) (1992).
62. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor in the role of a "debtor in possession" remains as the estate's representative. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1992). The debtor
in possession has the powers and duties granted to a trustee by the various Code
provisions. Id.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1992).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1992).
65. Id.

66. See II U.S.C. § 109(b) for a list of persons, partnerships or corporations
prohibited from filing under chapter 7.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1992). The debtor's duties are generally found in 11
U.S.C. § 521(1) (1992). See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4002. Failure of the debtor to
comply with his statutory duties may result in dismissal under §§ 707(a)(3), 1112(e),
1307(c)(9) or provide grounds for an objection to discharge in a chapter 7 case under
11 U.S.C. § 727 (1992). The bankruptcy court issues official notices to all listed
creditors and also provides creditors with information on how to assert their rights
with regard to the collection of debts on their respective claims. 11 U.S.C. § 342(b)
(1992); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002.
68. The trustee has the power to abandon any property which is burdensome
or inconsequential to the estate under § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code. Burdensome
property includes property that is overencumbered or that cannot otherwise be sold
or administered for the benefit of the creditors. The debtor is revested with the
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is required to attend a section 341 meeting over which the trustee
presides. The trustee examines the debtor's case and determines the
disposition of any existing assets. 70 Upon completion of liquidation

and distribution, the case is discharged and the debtor is granted a
fresh start. 71
Creditors may object to the discharge if the debtor has wrongfully
attempted to use bankruptcy. 72 Creditors may also bring an adversary

proceeding 73 against the debtor, alleging that their particular debt
should not be discharged in bankruptcy pursuant to section 523 of

property interest as of the date of filing the petition. The revested property may then
be foreclosed by the secured creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1992). The trustee's power
to abandon property is limited. The Supreme Court has held that the trustee may
not abandon environmentally contaminated property in contravention of state laws
that are reasonably designed to protect the public health and safety. Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 506 (1986); see
TREISTER, ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.04. The property that is no longer part of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate can then be collected upon by the creditor where applicable. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1992); see also TREISTER, ET AL., supra note 13, §
4.04.
69. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (1992).
70. The trustee liquidates the debtor's estate and distributes any existing nonexempt assets according to a priority schedule. The priorities are set forth in the
Bankruptcy Code and are paid out accordingly. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1992). In order
to give an individual a fresh start in life, the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to
keep a certain amount of personal property so he or she is not stripped of all
belongings when he or she enters into bankruptcy. When an individual files for
bankruptcy, certain property is listed as exempt. The amount allowed to be exempted
is controlled by law. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1992); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1992).
72. Section 727(c)(1) states, "the trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee
may object to the granting of a discharge under subsection (a) of this section." II
U.S.C. § 727(c)(1) (1992). Under § 727, a debtor can be denied a discharge by the
court if the debtor 1) is not an individual, 2) intended to hinder or delay or defraud
creditors through the transfer, removal, destruction, mutilation or concealment of
property of the debtor within one year before the date of filing or property of the
estate after the date of filing, 3) concealed or destroyed recorded information, 4)
made a false oath or account, 5) presented or used a false claim, 6) caused a
diminution of assets unsatisfactorily explained to the Court, or 7) failed to obey any
court order. Objection to the granting of a discharge may be made by the trustee, a
creditor, or the United States trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1992). Once the discharge is
granted, it can be revoked if the discharge was obtained through fraud or false
pretense, or if the debtor acquired property and failed to report the acquisition of
such property, or for failure to obey any court order. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) (1992).
73. An "adversary proceeding" is a lawsuit within a bankruptcy proceeding.
See TREISTER, ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.01(c). An action filed under § 523 is brought
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4007.
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the Bankruptcy Code. 74 Unlike section 727 which governs the dis-

chargeability of the entire bankruptcy case, section 523 applies only
to a particular debt.75

II. ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIM DISCHARGEABILITY: CURRENT STATE OF
THE LAW

The concept of a claim76 plays a crucial role within a bankruptcy
proceeding because only claims can be discharged under the Bankruptcy Code. 77 The definition of claim under the Bankruptcy Code
has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to include
78
any obligation of the debtor convertible into a monetary obligation.
However, the point at which an environmental claim arises has never
been addressed by the Supreme Court. 79 The apparent incompatibility
74. For example, chapter 7 debtors cannot discharge certain tax debts, any
debts which were obtained through false statements or fraud, debts which they did
not list on their schedules, debts for embezzlement, larceny, fraud or defalcation as
a fiduciary, alimony or child support debts, any debts stemming from a willful or
)malicious injury by the debtor to another, any fine or penalty for the benefit of a
governmental unit, certain student loans, or debts that arise out of drunk driving. 11
U.S.C. § 523 (1992).
75. Objections to discharge under § 727 and dischargeability under § 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code are two distinct concepts. Under § 727, if a bankruptcy discharge
is denied, then the debtor remains liable for all debts as if the bankruptcy had not
been filed at all. Those debts also cannot be discharged in the future. However, if a
debt is found non-dischargeable under § 523, that particular debt must be paid. The
debtor will receive a general discharge under § 727 relieving the debtor of other,
dischargeable debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1992).
76. The Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1992).
77. See TREISTER, ET AL., supra note 13, § 6.01.
78. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 278-79. See supra note 13, § 6.01; supra
part III.A.
79. In Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 (1985), the United States Supreme
Court held that a debtor's environmental cleanup obligation constitutes a "debt" or
"liability on a claim" under the Bankruptcy Code. If the debtor must expend money
to comply with a cleanup obligation, then that obligation is converted to a dischargeable debt. Id. at 283. However, the Court did not address the issue of when a
CERCLA "claim" arises. Id.
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of environmental and bankruptcy law stems from the competing policy
interests underlying the liability provisions within each statute. Lower
courts have been divided on this issue and have been unable to
produce a body of case law that is consistent with bankruptcy law's
fresh start doctrine and CERCLA's liability scheme. In an effort to
address both policy interests, four primary case law approaches have
emerged.
A.

THE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP

The Second Circuit's approach in Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV
Corp.A analyzed the relationship of the debtor and creditor to determine if the creditor could anticipate future claims against the debtor
for the debtor's prepetition conduct."1 If the creditor could have
reasonably anticipated future claims against the debtor stemming from
the debtor's prepetition conduct, then the claim is dischargeable.
In Chateaugay, the debtor LTV Corp., was a diversified steel,
aerospace, and energy corporation with operations in several states. 2
LTV filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and listed claims held by
the EPA and environmental agencies of all fifty states as "contingent." 8 3 The EPA filed a proof of claim for $32 million and alleged
that this amount only constituted a fraction of what it would cost to
finish cleaning up the sites, and that LTV may be identified as a PRP
for additional sites in the future s Therefore, the government argued,
that a claim had not arisen until all of the response costs had been
incurred. 5 The Chateaugay court held that if the response costs
concerned the prepetition release or the threatened release of hazardous waste, the incurred costs were prepetition claims, regardless of
86
when the actual costs were incurred.
80. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
81. Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp.j 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). See
Waterville Ind. v. First Hartford Corp., 124 B.R. 411, 413 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991)
(stating that debtor was on notice that successors in title could be ultimately obliged
to incur cleanup costs because debtor knew of environmental hazards debtor created);
see also supra text accompanying note 15. But see Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v.
Allegheny Int'l, 126 B.R. 919, 925 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that mere
knowledge of the existence of hazardous waste and identification of potentially
responsible parties does not constitute a legal relationship justifying a claim in

bankruptcy unless an abatement order is issued or action is commenced seeking
reimbursement).
82. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1005.
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The court placed great weight on the relationship between the
EPA and LTV to determine whether the EPA could have reasonably
anticipated future claims against the debtor.17 Relying on In re All
Media Properties, Inc.,88 the court considered whether the EPA's
response costs not yet incurred could be included as "contingent" or
"unmatured" claims under the Bankruptcy Code. 9 In determining
whether an obligation falls under the Code's inclusion of "unmatured" or "contingent" claims, the court in In re All Media Properties, Inc., applied a "contemplation of the parties" test: "the Code's
inclusion of 'unmatured' and 'contingent' claims is usually said to
refer to obligations that will become due upon the happening of a
future event that was within the actual or presumed contemplation of
the parties at the time the original relationship between the parties
was created." 90
Due to Congress' intent to broadly apply the definition of claim
under the Bankruptcy Code, 9' the Chateaugay court stated that the
EPA's definition of claim was too narrow, especially since LTV's
obligations arose out of public regulation. 92 The court then applied
contract principles to find that the EPA's claim for response costs
was a "contingent claim" within the meaning of section 101(5)(A) of
the Bankruptcy Code. The Second Circuit also looked to other courts
which construed the broad definition of claim under the Bankruptcy
Code. 93 Other courts have held that individuals exposed to hazardous
products had claims, despite the lack of any apparent injury. 94
The court stated that although the relationship between the EPA
and LTV was not normally as close as one that exists in an unmatured

87. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005.
88. In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980),
aff'd mem., 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981).
89. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1004.
90. In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. at 133.
91. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266.
92. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005.
93. Id.
94. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 686-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986); cf. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.) (holding that a

user of a Dalkon Shield had a claim even though her injury was not shown to have
been caused from her use of the shield), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); In re
Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (holding that an injury resulting

from negligent dental service constituted a claim, although the negligence was
discovered post-petition); Mark Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
846, 895-96 (1984).
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contract claim, the relationship was much closer than that existing
between a tortfeasor and future tort claimants unaware of injury
arising from prepetition contact. 95 The court stated, "EPA is acutely
aware of LTV and vice versa." 96 From the preceding analysis, the
court held that the relationship between the EPA and those subject
to regulation provides sufficient contemplation of potential CERCLA
liability to bring most CERCLA obligations based on prepetition
97
conduct within the definition of claims.
The Second Circuit's approach attempted to strike a balance
between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. 9s However, this approach focused heavily on the broad definition of claim and weighed
more heavily on the side of the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. As a
result, the EPA would be required to investigate all bankruptcy filings
which come within its regulatory power, regardless of whether the
EPA had previously detected a hazardous waste release on the site,
in order to assert its rights as a creditor under the Bankruptcy Code. 99
Requiring the government to investigate the bankruptcy filings
of all hazardous waste sites falling under the EPA's regulatory power
would seriously undermine the EPA's efforts in recovering response
costs. The public resources available for cleanup are severely limited
compared to the size of the hazardous waste problem.1° The time and
money that the EPA would spend on investigation of bankruptcy
filings could be more effectively used for cleanups. 10
In addition, under CERCLA, the EPA is required to prioritize
cleanup efforts and concentrate its resources on waste sites ranked
near the top of its NPL.102 If the EPA is required to investigate all
sites that file for bankruptcy within its regulatory authority, the EPA
would be pressured to investigate and take remedial actions at sites
dictated by the financial status of the PRP, rather than by the severity
0 3
of the contamination.

95. Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 1005.
96. Id.
97. Id. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
98. See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005.
99. Id. at 1006.
100. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
101. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 2, at 421.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (1988). Once a hazardous release is discovered, the
EPA utilizes a hazard ranking system to assess the site's degree of risk to human
health and the environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1988). Sites with a high ranking
may be placed on the national priority list.
103. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9605(c) (1988).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

Furthermore, although the Bankruptcy Code's definition of claim

has been broadly construed, the Chateaugay court overlooked Congress' definition of claims as "contingent," 1° which indicates that the
claim must be reasonably foreseeable and reasonably estimated. 105 By

broadly interpreting the relationship required for a claim to arise, the
court frustrated the rationale for using a relationship approach:
that
°
a creditor with a relationship may foresee its potential claim.' 0

Arguably, the EPA's regulatory authority over a debtor may give
rise to the foreseeability of future claims, but an environmental
contingent or unmatured claim should arise at the time when the EPA
identified the debtor as a PRP and issued official notice as to potential
hazardous waste liabilities. 107 Both the PRP and the EPA would be
aware of the possibility that a debt would arise if the PRP fails to
comply with an administrative order requiring the PRP to cleanup
the site. At this point, the possibility of a future claim against the
PRP would be definitely foreseeable by both the EPA and the PRP. 08
B.

THE CONDUCT OF THE DEBTOR

The Ninth Circuit's approach in Jensen v. Bank of America °9

concentrated solely on the prepetition conduct of the debtor to
determine when a CERCLA claim arose under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Jensen court stated that if a release or threatened release of
hazardous waste occurred prepetition, the debt is dischargeable." 0

104. Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part:
(c) There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this section (1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which,
as the case may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1992).
105. See In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1980).
106. See Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1991).
107. See United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835-36
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
108. See In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. at 133.
109. Jensen v. Bank of Am., 114 B.R. 700 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 127
B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
110. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc.,
853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Torwico Elec., Inc., 131 B.R. 561, 573
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (holding that clean up obligations arising out of pre-petition
conduct of the debtor were dischargeable); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg, 113 B.R.
709, 712 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (holding that the "act which constitutes the basis
for the cause of action must have occurred prior to filing the petition in bankruptcy."); Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990),
aff'd, 930 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991).
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In Jensen, the debtors owned and operated Jensen Lumber
Company ("JLC")."' Part of JLC's operations involved the dipping
of lumber in a fungicide solution containing pentachlorophenol
("PCP"). The solution was held in an above-ground cinderblock
tank. In December of 1983, JLC ceased operations and filed a chapter
11 voluntary petition. 1 2 When JLC closed, it left the above-ground
dip tank still filled with the PCP solution. The Jensens filed a personal
no-asset chapter 7 case on February 13, 1984 and received a discharge
on July 16, 1984. The JLC case had been converted to a chapter 7
on March 20, 1984 and was closed on March 18, 1987." 3
The State of California notified the debtors that they were
potentially liable for the cleanup two years after the close of their
bankruptcy." 4 The debtors sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether their CERCLA liability had been discharged."' The
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel rejected the State's argument that it did not have a claim subject to discharge until after
cleanup costs were incurred." 6 The court held that the cleanup liability
was discharged because the toxin release occurred prepetition." 7 This
ruling covered releases that occurred prepetition, even if they had not
been discovered.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Jensen does not respect either the
objectives of CERCLA or the limitations of the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts have utilized the Ninth Circuit's approach primarily in the
context of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision." 8 In
contrast to the Code's discharge provisions, which permanently affect
the creditor's ability to collect on its claim," 9 the automatic stay only
temporarily deprives the creditor of its rights. 120 However, courts have
extended the examination of the debtor's conduct to apply to the
question of when a claim arises for the purposes of dischargeability.

111. Jensen, 114 B.R. at 700.
112. Id. at 701.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 702.
116. Jensen v. Bank of Am., 114 B.R. 700 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 127
B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
117. Jensen, 127 B.R. at 33.
118. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed sub nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 686-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1992).
120. See supra note 51.
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In the context of the automatic stay, courts concentrating on the
conduct of the debtor do not have to consider whether the creditor
could foresee its claim. In this context, the creditor has filed a motion
for relief from the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions,1 2'
and therefore, is already aware of its right prior to the close of the
bankruptcy proceeding. The utilization of this same approach to
determine dischargeability of the debtor's CERCLA debts poses the
problem that the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding may be completed
before the EPA is even aware of its claim. Neither the Bankruptcy
Code nor legislative history suggests that a creditor's claim should be
22
discharged before the creditor even knows of its existence .
The Ninth Circuit's approach suggests that even if an environmental regulatory agency and a debtor had no contact whatsoever, a
legal obligation could result without either party being aware of such
a relationship.2 3 Expecting claims to be filed by those who have not
yet had any contact whatsoever with the tortfeasor has been characterized as 'absurd."'' 24 Even where a tort victim has had some
prepetition contact with the tortfeasor, such as purchasing a product
or working in proximity to hazardous materials, some courts have
refused to recognize a claim prior to some manifestation of injury. 25
Without adequate information, one cannot realistically expect the
EPA to reasonably estimate its claim against the debtor when there
121. Section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code lists the exceptions to the automatic
stay. 1I U.S.C. § 362(b)(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4001,
the creditor must file a motion in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 9014, and must
supply the debtor in possession or trustee with notice of the motion and the time
within which objections may be filed. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001. If no objections are
filed, the court may enter an order approving or disapproving the motion. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 4001, 9014.
122. "Due process will certainly require notice to all creditors and equity security
holders." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5828.
123. See Jensen v. Bank of Am., 127 B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
124. Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1985)
(citing Gladding Corp. v. Forbes, 20 B.R. 566, 568 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985)); see also Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Foster, 730 F.2d
367, 375 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the victims of a post-bankruptcy accident
resulting from pre-petition design defect did not have "claims" under the former
Bankruptcy Act).
125. See Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 944; In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58
B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Amatex Corp., 30 B.R. 309, 315 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 37 B.R. 613 (Bankr. E.D. P~a. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 755
F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985) (future claimants entitled to representation, whether or not
holding "claims").
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had been no prepetition contact between the debtor and the EPA.
The discharging of liability solely on the basis of a prepetition release
of hazardous substances directly conflicts with CERCLA's goal of
efficient environmental cleanup. 26 The EPA's attention to the most
hazardous sites will be diverted to the investigation of any and all
sites that fall under the bankruptcy court's protection. 127 If the EPA
is not provided with adequate information with which it can assert its
claim, valuable time and money will be diverted from cleanup and
28
enforcement actions to investigate PRPs entering bankruptcy.
C.

THE EXPENDITURE OF RESPONSE COSTS

Courts following the ruling in United States v. Union Scrap Iron
& Metal 29 rely primarily on non-bankruptcy law to determine at

which point a bankruptcy claim arises. 30 This approach focuses on

relevant state and federal law in determining at which point the cause
3
of action arises.' '
126. See Jensen v. Bank of Am., 114 B.R. 700, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
127. Id.
128. See United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 834 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1990); H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2863 (evidencing congressional intent in amending CERCLA to create a system in which the government and private parties would cleanup
hazardous waste releases first and litigate liability later). Also, Congress expressed
concern that requiring the EPA "to complete cleanups before it has adequately
assessed the site or before it knows how to perform a permanent cleanup would
.make little environmental or economic sense, and would likely produce cleanups that
are temporary, requiring further expenditures to correct those mistakes." H.R. REP.
No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2838.
129. United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990).
130. See Avelino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) (holding that under New York law, an accounting
firm did not have a "right to payment" from its client until it was sued by the bank);
see also Lugo v. Paulsen, 886 F.2d 602, 607 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Remington Rand,
836 F.2d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the determination of whether a valid
bankruptcy claim exists depends on whether the claimant had a prepetition right to
payment); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 941-44 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985) (stating that a bankruptcy claim must be
based on state or federal law, aside from bankruptcy, that creates substantive
obligations); Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 126 B.R. 919,
925 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that the determination of whether CERCLA
liabilities are dischargeable depends on whether a right to recover payment existed
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
131. See Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 941-44; see also In re Remington Rand, 836
F.2d at 830.
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In Union Scrap, the federal district court held that the EPA did
32
not have a dischargeable claim until response costs were incurred.'
One year after Taracorp Industries filed for bankruptcy, the State of
Minnesota detected hazardous wastes at a site at which Taracorp had
processed automobile batteries."' Four years after the confirmation
of Taracorp's reorganization plan, the EPA identified the company
as a PRP. 3 4 Taracorp sought a declaratory judgment to determine
whether its CERCLA claim had been discharged.' 3 5
Relying solely on CERCLA's statutory language, the court rejected Taracorp's argument and held that CERCLA liability was not
discharged because the EPA had not incurred response costs until
after the close of Taracorp's bankruptcy.'3 6 Relying on In re Remington Rand Corp., the court stated that non-bankruptcy substantive law
provides the context from which a legal obligation reflecting a claim
for bankruptcy purposes arises.' 3 7 The court stated, "CERCLA provides no basis for Taracorp's position .... Because the EPA had
incurred no response costs at the time of Taracorp's confirmation,
38
the EPA could have no claim in the bankruptcy proceedings."'
The federal district court's ruling in Union Scrap addresses the
objectives of CERCLA to the exclusion of the objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code. 39 A determination that CERCLA response costs
do not become claims under the Bankruptcy Code until the costs are
actually incurred, may impair the chapter 11 debtor's prospects of
achieving a viable reorganization, and result in liquidation under
chapter 7 or dissolution under state law.'14 If liquidation or dissolution
occurs, the corporation's assets would not be available for environmental cleanup."14
Congress intended a broad definition of claim in the Bankruptcy
Code to include any right to payment, no matter how remote or
contingent.' 42 Relying solely on CERCLA's statutory language to

132. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. at 835.
133. Id.at 832.

134. Id.
135. Id.

136. Id.at 836-37.
137. Id.at 835.
138. Id.at 836.

139. Id.
140. See Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).

141. Id.
142. See supra note 76. See S.
which states:

REP.

No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978)
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determine when a claim arises directly contradicts the broad definition
of claim within the Bankruptcy Code. 143 Under the Bankruptcy Code,
a claim can be contingent as long as the liability is reasonably
foreseeable and can be reasonably estimated. 144 The assertion that a
claim only arises upon the expenditure of funds by the EPA is directly
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's definition.145 Once the debtor
is notified of potential CERCLA liability, the debt can be considered
contingent regardless of when the actual costs of the cleanup are
46

incurred. 1
An approach that is more consistent with the goals of CERCLA
and the Bankruptcy Code was taken by the Seventh Circuit in In re
CMC Heartland Partners.14 Although this approach comes much
closer to providing a compromise between these two competing policies, the approach only encompasses PRPs who are current owners
of hazardous waste sites.
D. THE CLAIM "RUNNING WITH THE LAND"

In CMC HeartlandPartners,the Seventh Circuit held that liability
under CERCLA, based on a debtor's current ownership of the
hazardous waste site, is a claim running with the land, and therefore,
survives chapter 11 reorganization.' 48 The court stated:
By authorizing the President to direct the current owner to
cleanup a dump, CERCLA creates a claim running with the
land. Such claims depend not at all on the debtor's actions
149
before or during the reorganization.
By this broadest possible definition and by the use of the term throughout
the title 11 (sic), especially in subchapter I of chapter 5, the bill contemplates
that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent,
will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest
possible relief in the bankruptcy court.
143. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5809.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1992).
145. See supra note 76.

146. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991); Jensen v. Bank of Am., 127 B.R. 27
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 699-700 n.8 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1986).
147. In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
148. Id. at 1146.
149. Id.
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For example, if a debtor sold a hazardous waste site to another entity
after its reorganization plan was confirmed, the successor could be
liable under section 106(a) even though it played no role in the
depositing of the waste. The court noted that it would be illogical for
a debtor, as owner, to be discharged from liability for the contaminated site, while holding a successor owner liable if the debtor later
sold the site. 150 "Just as security interests and other liens pass through
a bankruptcy unaffected and stick with the asset on transfer to any
new buyer, so a statutory obligation attached to current ownership of
the land survives bankruptcy."''
In CMC Heartland, the Milwaukee Road mined needed gravel
and leased the remaining pit to General Motors Corporation in 1956.152
General Motors used the pit until 1974 to dump paint sludge and coal
ash generated by a nearby plant. General Motors closed the pit,
following the requirements of the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources at the time, to prevent leaching and leakage of the sludge.'
In 1984, the pit was listed on the National Priorities List established
by section 105(a)(8) of CERCLA. The effective date of the listing was
a year before the final date for filing claims in the bankruptcy.
Listing has no direct legal consequence, but it signifies the
EPA's belief that the site is releasing or likely to release
hazardous substances. Because it reveals the EPA's assessment
of hazards and (rough) priorities for cleanup, listing is an
ominous sign. If it does nothing else, listing makes the parcel
something less than prime real estate, with effects on the
54
owner's wealth.
When a chapter 11 reorganization plan is confirmed, a "new
firm" is created and the debts and liabilities of the "old firm" are
extinguished. Therefore, the "new firm" is responsible for any environmental cleanup obligations that are incurred after this cleavage
takes place. Any environmental obligations that were incurred by the
"old firm" are discharged once the plan is confirmed.' 55
The Seventh Circuit's approach is a definite step forward toward
achieving a viable compromise between the competing policy goals of
CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. Unfortunately, the court still
150. Id.at 1147.
151. Id.

152. Inre CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1145 (7th Cir. 1992).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.at 1146-47.
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viewed claims by former operators and former owners as general
unsecured claims, dischargeable at the time the plan of reorganization
is confirmed. Furthermore, the court only addresses claims of current
owners of hazardous waste sites. It does not address the difficult
question that arises when a claim from a prior owner or operator
remains unsettled.
Until Congress enacts an exception to dischargeability for environmental claims, the courts must make a consistent determination
as to when an environmental claim arises under the Bankruptcy Code.
The logical choice is to adopt an actual notice standard whereby a
claim would arise at the time the government officially informed a
PRP of potential environmental liability.

III.
A.

PROVIDING PREDICTABILITY: ACTUAL NOTICE AND SECTION
523156

THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION: AN ACTUAL NOTICE STANDARD

Recent case law does not adequately present a compromise that

best facilitates the goals and purposes underlying both CERCLA and

the Bankruptcy Code.1 7 To further those goals and purposes, courts

should hold that CERCLA liability under the Bankruptcy Code only
arises after hazardous waste is detected and the party is actually
notified that the EPA has identified them as a PRP. This requirement
brings the claim into the "actual contemplation of the parties' ' 5
more readily than the existence of a mere regulatory relationship. If
this notification is made prepetition or prior to the confirmation of a
reorganization plan, the claim would be dischargeable. At this point,
the government could also request a federal lien to be placed on the
property 59 or request dismissal of the case under section 707(a).160
The EPA should be given adequate notice of a PRP's pending
bankruptcy and allowed an opportunity to assert its rights under the
Bankruptcy Code.' 6' An actual notice standard would ensure that
156. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1992).
157. See Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 1988); Penn Terra Ltd. v.
Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 1984); Jensen v. Bank
of Am., 114 B.R. 700, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
158. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1004.
159. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
161. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978) ("Due process will
certainly require notice to all creditors and equity security holders."); see also 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1992); City of New York v. New York, N. Haven & Hartford
R.R., 344 U.S. 296, 296 (1953).
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both parties knew of a relationship giving rise to potential liability. It
would allow a reasonable opportunity for the government to enter62
into settlement agreements which may prevent the bankruptcy filing.
One underlying goal of SARA is to encourage the use of settlement agreements by the EPA and other agencies responsible for
implementing the Superfund Program. 63 Settlement efforts are crucial
to the CERCLA system in that they represent an alternative to full
prosecution of strictly, jointly and severally liable parties.'6 Under
the settlement provisions, the EPA is authorized to enter into agreements to freeze a responsible party's percentage share of future
65
cleanup costs and authorize covenants not to sue for future liability.1
Congress noted, "[p]rivate parties may be more willing to assume the
financial responsibility for cleanup if they are assured that they can
seek contribution from others."'' i Parties who settle would be protected from paying any future response costs connected with the
67
site. 1
When a PRP of a hazardous waste site is insolvent or has filed
a bankruptcy petition, all of the disincentives associated with joint
and several liability arise. Solvent PRPs will delay cleanup in order
68
to locate additional responsible parties to contribute to the costs.
Further, settlement agreements would not be possible under either the
Second Circuit or Ninth Circuit's approach, because the EPA may
not yet be aware of the existence of the PRP. An actual notice
standard would serve to deter PRPs from filing bankruptcy upon the
release of hazardous waste in an attempt to avoid all past and future
CERCLA liability. Under an actual notice standard, the EPA would
have performed an investigation necessary to determine that the party
162. Congress intended to encourage settlement of response costs by attempting
to include as many actors as possible within the scope of liability and by limiting
defenses to liability. Harvard-Law Review Association, Note, Liability of Parent
Corporationsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REv. 986
(1986).
163. 138 CONG. REC. S13,895 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Stafford).
164. Id.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988).
166. 138 CONG. REc. S13,895 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Stafford).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988).
168. For a discussion on contingent contribution claims under the Bankruptcy
Code see Lori Jonas, Note, Dividing the Toxic Pie: Why Superfund Contingent
Contribution Claims Should Not Be Barred by the Bankruptcy Code, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV.

850 (1991).
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was a PRP. Therefore, the EPA would have a greater opportunity to
attempt a settlement agreement prior to a party's filing for bankruptcy. If the debtor can avoid all known and unknown liability by
filing bankruptcy, little incentive exists for entering into a settlement
agreement. 69

The actual notice standard would allow time for the EPA to
enter into settlement agreements and provide sufficient notice to both
parties of environmental liability. This approach is consistent with the
language of the Bankruptcy Code and better serves to facilitate
CERCLA's underlying purposes. An actual notice standard alone,
however, is insufficient. In order to efficiently address this problem
for the protection of human health and safety, an exception to
dischargeability under the Bankruptcy Code should be enacted by
Congress. 170
B.

THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: A PROPOSED EXCEPTION UNDER
SECTION 523

Courts have been unable to develop a consistent body of precedent with regard to this issue due to the strongly competing public
policy interests of both CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. Congress

should amend the Bankruptcy Code to come into balance with environmental statutes.1 71 The omission of an exception under the Bankruptcy Code should not be interpreted to suggest that Congress
intended to exclude environmental claims from the list of excepted
1

72

claims.
A more consistent interpretation argues that the omission was
due to the unforeseeability of monetary environmental obligations

imposed on debtors. 7 3 Monetary cleanup claims did not come into

existence until the enactment of CERCLA in 1980. In view of these
facts, one can logically conclude that the drafters of the Bankruptcy
74
Code did not foresee the arrival of monetary environmental claims.
169. The Second Circuit's reasoning in Union Scrap would frustrate CERCLA's
goals of expediting cleanup because the EPA would be forced to respond to numerous
bankruptcy filings which may involve unknown environmental liabilities. See United
States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 834 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
170. See Blackham, supra note 33, at 1385; Linda Johannsen, Note, United
States v. Whizco, Inc.: A Further Refinement of the Conflict Between Bankruptcy
Discharge and Environmental Cleanup Obligations, 20 ENVTL. L. 207, 231 (1990).
171. See Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
172. See Gary E. Claar, The Casefor a Bankruptcy Code Priorityfor Environmental Cleanup Claims, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 29, 34. (1992).
173. Id. at 38-42.
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1992); Claar, supra note 172 at 34.
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Prior to the passage of CERCLA in 1980, environmental obligations were regulatory in nature.' 75 The EPA imposed affirmative
obligations such as nonmonetary penalties, and standards of safety.
These affirmative obligations were of the type contemplated by the
drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, not the monetary obligations imposed after CERCLA's enactment in 1980.176 Congress did provide
for environmental enforcement against debtors through "governmental unit" exceptions to the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy
Code. 177 The legislative intent with regard to these exceptions was to
"prevent or stop violation or fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety or similar police or regulatory laws." 1 78 Also,
affirmative nonmonetary obligations were not included within the
definition of claim 179 under the Bankruptcy Code and were, therefore,
80
nondischargeable. 1
Further evidence that the omission of environmental obligations
under CERCLA from exceptions listed under the Bankruptcy Code
was not intentional is found in MidlanticNational Bank v. New Jersey
Department of EnvironmentalProtection.181 The Supreme Court noted:
Congress had repeatedly expressed its legislative determination
that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore nonbankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has conferred
special powers upon the trustee and where there was no
common-law limitation on that power, Congress has expressly
provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest
82
in public health and safety.
175. Examples of the environmental regulatory statutes include the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(1988), the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1988), and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91 (1988).
176. See Claar, supra note 172 at 34.
177. Under § 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code, an exception from discharge is
provided "to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and
from the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss, other than a tax penalty." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1992).
178. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978).
179. See supra note 76.
180. See II U.S.C. § 727(a) (discharge provisions under chapter 7); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(d) (discharge provisions under chapter 11).
181. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494 (1986).
182. Id. at 507 (holding that a trustee may not abandon contaminated sites in
contravention of the state's environmental law).
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Although, Midlantic concerned the question of whether a trustee may
abandon contaminated property, one can infer that congressional
concern over public health and safety should be extended to the
question of whether an exception to dischargeability should be enacted.
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide debtors with
a fresh start. However, this purpose is not as compelling as the
protection and safety of a potentially endangered public. The total
releases of toxic chemicals reported for 1988 throughout the state of
Illinois alone was 348,312,021 pounds.1 8 3 The chemicals reported as
being released in Illinois are documented as potentially causing various
health effects. 8 4 Many of these chemicals have been identified as
causing or potentially causing chronic health effects in humans or,
rather, health effects which develop after a long period of exposure. 8 5
A possible draft of the proposed exception could read as follows:
§ 523. EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt(14) for state or federal environmental liability unless (a) liability arose more than 6 years prior to the filing of
debtor's petition; or
(b) if excepting liability will result in undue hardship on
the debtor or debtor's dependents.
This proposed amendment would greatly aid the government in effectuating efficient cleanups without totally undermining the fresh start
objectives under the Bankruptcy Code. The six-year limitation within
subsection (a) corresponds to the statute of limitations within CERCLA. 8 6 Thus, the EPA will have sufficient time within which to
propose settlement agreements with the debtor without totally barring
a debtor's relief from these obligations.
Subsection (b) provides for an undue hardship provision in the
event a settlement agreement cannot be reached and/or no other
183. ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Toxic CHEMICAL ANN. REP. 17
(1990).
184. Id. at 9. Section 313 of EPCRA requires annual reports to be filed by
certain companies which release any of 328 listed toxic chemicals to the environment.

The reporting consists of routine releases that occur as a result of normal business

operations within a calendar year, and non-routine or accidental releases. Id. at 5.
185. Id. at 9.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (1992).
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responsible parties can be found. This provision would be most
applicable to a sole proprietorship or a small business which reorganizes or liquidates under the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor would have
the burden to prove undue hardship according to a test similar to the
one set out in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services,
Corp. ' 7 The test requires a three-part showing:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income
and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living if forced to
repay the cleanup costs; (2) that additional circumstances exist
indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant period; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith
efforts to repay the cleanup costs.'
For the foregoing reasons, Congress should define the point at
which liability on a claim arises as the time when official notification
was issued identifying a party as a PRP.' s9 Also, an exception should
be created under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code for environmental liabilities incurred within six years prior to the filing of the
debtor's petition.
CONCLUSION

Cleanup of hazardous waste sites is a growing problem of national
concern. The goal of CERCLA is to remedy this problem as quickly
as possible at the expense of the responsible parties. The Bankruptcy
Code provides a means for a debtor to obtain relief from indebtedness
and to obtain a fresh start.
Courts have been unable to develop a consistent body of precedent as to the point at which a CERCLA claim arises under the
Bankruptcy Code due to the strongly competing policy interests
involved. The current approaches to this problem employed by the
courts are inadequate to provide a compromise between the policy
187. Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services, Corp., 831 F.2d

395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).

188. Id. The test in Brunner relates to the undue hardship provision under §
523(a)(8) providing for an exception to dischargeability of government guaranteed

student loans. Id. Due to the more dangerous effects of potential abuse of bankruptcy
to discharge environmental liability, however, a more stringent standard for undue
hardship may be warranted.
189. Although an exception to dischargeability raises a questionable need for an
actual notice standard, a consistent standard would still be necessary under the
proposed amendment to determine whether the claim falls within the statute of
limitations provided for in the amended exception.
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objectives of both CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. Both the
Second Circuit's approach and the Ninth Circuit's approach adhere
to the policy objectives of bankruptcy law without adequately addressing the health and safety concerns underlying CERCLA. On the other
hand, the court's approach in Union Scrap adheres to the policy
objectives of CERCLA without addressing the policy objectives of
the fresh start doctrine under the Bankruptcy Code.
A proposed solution to this problem would utilize an actual
notice standard in conjunction with the enactment of an environmental
liability exception. This proposal would facilitate settlement agreements between the EPA and PRPs. It would also eliminate the
incentive for the PRPs to quickly file a bankruptcy petition once a
hazardous waste release was discovered. Furthermore, the provisions
of undue hardship and a statute of limitations period incorporated
into the exception would hinder the fresh start doctrine, but it would
not seriously undermine its purposes.
DENISE M. SCHUH

